

Security assessment of WhibOx 2017 candidates

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WhibOx 2019 workshop

WhibOx 2017 rules

- ▶ Submit white-boxed AES-128 implementation
- ▶ Pure C code (no includes, libraries, ...)
- ▶ Source \leq 50MB, binary \leq 20 MB, avg. runtime \leq 1s
- ▶ Designer goal: remain unbroken
- ▶ Attacker goal: break as fast as possible

WhibOx 2017 results

- ▶ 94 implementations (1 invalid)
- ▶ 13 earned > 0 points
 - ▶ 10 designers
- ▶ ALL broken
- ▶ Detailed presentation & write-up for winning challenge
- ▶ No (public) write-ups for others(?)

- ▶ How many can be broken in an *automated* way?
 - ▶ i.e., without (much) reverse engineering
 - ▶ DCA/DFA
- ▶ Classification by size, speed, security

Attack classification

- ▶ Automated
 - ▶ DCA
 - ▶ DFA
 - ▶ Higher-order DCA
- ▶ Manual effort
 - ▶ DCA after modification
 - ▶ Devirtualization
 - ▶ Removal of time-consuming code
 - ▶ DFA after modification
 - ▶ Removal of duplicate rounds
 - ▶ Removal of pseudo-randomness
 - ▶ Other methods
- ▶ Unbroken
 - ▶ Reverse engineering effort

Toolchain

- ▶ customized Intel PIN plugin for trace acquisition
- ▶ Jlsca for efficient DCA
- ▶ DFA script from SideChannelMarvels
- ▶ customized *aes-brute-force* tool for round-10-key-bruteforcing
 - ▶ *Hulk* from SideChannelMarvels does the same, but better

Differential computation analysis (DCA)

- ▶ Software counterpart to differential power analysis (DPA)
- ▶ Collect software execution traces
- ▶ Use statistical methods to figure out correct key bytes

DCA countermeasures

- ▶ Masking sensitive values throughout computation
 - ▶ Generate pseudo-randomness from input
- ▶ Artificially enlarging traces by dummy operations
 - ▶ Useful for contest
 - ▶ Not desired for real-world implementations

Differential fault analysis (DFA)

- ▶ Obtain correct output for specific input
- ▶ Induce faulty outputs by e.g. flipping bits
- ▶ Collect faulty outputs
- ▶ Compare against correct output
- ▶ Compute last round key
- ▶ Compute actual AES key

DFA countermeasures

- ▶ Compute results twice & compare
- ▶ Mute output/set output to unrelated
- ▶ Other countermeasures
 - ▶ < 4 faulty state bytes in r9
 - ▶ > 4 faulty state bytes in r9
 - ▶ Faulty state bytes in wrong position
 - ▶ "Skip" r9 vulnerability

Higher-order DCA

- ▶ Combine k samples of computation trace
- ▶ Exponential complexity
- ▶ Second-order is feasible for *some* implementations
- ▶ Reveals key for at least one first-order-resistant implementation
 - ▶ Apparently also breakable using other methods

DCA

- ▶ A lot of dummy-submissions
- ▶ Some using dual ciphers
 - ▶ Use different selection function (Klemsa model)
- ▶ ≥ 1 Challenge resistant against input-DCA but vuln. to output-DCA
- ▶ Majority breakable by DCA
 - ▶ 14 AES reference implementations
 - ▶ 19 T6_256 by *chaes*
 - ▶ 17 other
 - ▶ = 50 in total
- ▶ Some more can be broken when modified

DFA

- ▶ Only applied when DCA failed
- ▶ Good against virtualized implementations (Tigress)
- ▶ Manual injection sometimes better than automated
- ▶ 3/4 columns sufficient (last can be brute-forced)
- ▶ Another 7 broken using script, 7 broken manually


Modifications

- ▶ DCA improvements
 - ▶ Removal of dummy code
 - ▶ Removal of non-constant code
 - ▶ Removal of trace-enlarging code (JH hash computation)
 - ▶ Devirtualization
 - ▶ Breaks 5 more challenges using DCA
- ▶ DFA improvements
 - ▶ Removal of duplicate rounds
 - ▶ Removal of DFA protection (obviously)


Leftover challenges

- ▶ All with > 0 points except *festive_jennings* (using DFA, 3/4 cols)
- ▶ Second generation by *kluxc3qa1* (5 submissions)
- ▶ Two more submissions by different authors
 - ▶ One of them encoding input bits as (0=0x00000000, 1=0xffffffff7), adding rk-bits as uint32, then bitsliced implementation
 - ▶ The other one using multiple nested lookups


All source size



Top 8 source size



Top 8 binary size



Security considerations

- ▶ Unbroken = good, broken = bad?
- ▶ Can we combine: small, fast, secure?
 - ▶ Industry: "secure" \approx not broken in $\leq x$ days
 - ▶ Only breakable with manual effort
 - ▶ Refresh implementation before it is broken
- ▶ Automated attacks vs. manual effort
- ▶ Break one, break all?