




Leakage Assessment Methodology

- a clear roadmap for side-channel evaluations -


Tobias Schneider and Amir Moradi

Wednesday, September 16th, 2015


Motivation Security Evaluation





Motivation Security Evaluation



Motivation Security Evaluation




Motivation Security Evaluation



Problem: Evaluation is not trivial.

Motivation Security Evaluation




NIST *Non-Invasive Attack Testing Workshop, 2011*

Goal: Establish testing methodology capable of robustly assessing the physical vulnerability of cryptographic devices.


Motivation **Attack-based Testing**

Perform state-of-the-art attacks on the device under test (DUT)



Motivation **Attack-based Testing**

Perform state-of-the-art attacks on the device under test (DUT)



Problems:

- High computational complexity
- Requires lot of expertise
- Does not cover all possible attack vectors


Motivation Testing based on t -Test

Tries to detect any type of leakage at a certain order

- Proposed by CRI at NIST workshop

Advantages:

- Independent of architecture
- Independent of attack model
- Fast & simple
- Versatile



Motivation Testing based on t -Test


Tries to detect any type of leakage at a certain order



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Advantages:

- Independent of architecture
- Independent of attack model
- Fast & simple
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Problems:

- No information about hardness of attack
- Possible false positives if no care about evaluation setup



Contribution

1. Explain statistical background in a (hopefully) more understandable way
2. More detailed discussion of higher-order testing
3. Hints how to design fast & correct measurement setup
4. Optimization of analysis phase


Statistical Background

- *t*-Test


Statistical Background *t*-Test



Statistical Background *t*-Test




Sample Q_0




Sample Q_1

Statistical Background *t*-Test



Sample Q_0



Sample Q_1

Null Hypothesis: Two population means are equal.

Statistical Background *t*-Test




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


Sample Q_1

Statistical Background *t*-Test



Statistical Background *t*-Test



Statistical Background *t*-Test

t

v

Estimate the probability to accept null hypothesis with Student's *t* distribution:

$$f(t, v) = \frac{\Gamma\left(\frac{v+1}{2}\right)}{\sqrt{\pi v} \Gamma\left(\frac{v}{2}\right)} \left(1 + \frac{t^2}{v}\right)^{-\frac{v+1}{2}}$$

Compute:
$$p = 2 \int_{|t|}^{\infty} f(t, v) dt$$

Statistical Background *t*-Test

t

v

Estimate the probability to accept null hypothesis with Student's t distribution:


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Compute:
$$p = 2 \int_{|t|}^{\infty} f(t, v) dt$$

Small p values give evidence to reject the null hypothesis

Statistical Background *t*-Test

- For testing usually only the *t*-value is estimated
- Compared to a threshold of $|t| > 4.5$
 - $p = 2F(-4.5, v > 1000) < 0.00001$
 - Confidence of > 0.99999 to reject the null hypothesis



Testing Methodology

- **Specific t -Test**
- **Non-Specific t -Test**


Testing Methodology **Specific t -Test**

Measurements T_i
With
Associated Data D_i

Specific t -Test:

- Key is known to enable correct partitioning
- Test is conducted at each sample point separately (univariate)
- If corresponding t -test exceeds threshold \Rightarrow DPA probable


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Testing Methodology Non-Specific t -Test


Non-Specific t -Test:

- *fixed vs. random t -test*
- Avoids being dependent on any intermediate value/model
- Detected leakage of single test is not always exploitable
- *Semi-fixed vs. random t -test* useful in certain cases

Testing Methodology Non-Specific t -Test

Non-Specific t -Test:



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Testing Methodology Non-Specific t -Test

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
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Higher-Order Testing

- **Multivariate**
- **Univariate**


Higher-Order Testing **Multivariate**



Multivariate:

- Sensitive variable is shared: $S = S_1 \circ S_2$
- Shares are processed at different time instances (SW)
- Leakages at different time instances need to be combined first

Higher-Order Testing **Multivariate**




Multivariate:

S_1

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Higher-Order Testing **Multivariate**




Multivariate:

S_1

S_2

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Higher-Order Testing **Multivariate**



Multivariate:


S_1

S_2

- Sensitive variable is shared: $S = S_1 \circ S_2$
- Shares are processed at different time instances (SW)
- Leakages at different time instances need to be combined first

$$\text{Centered Product: } x' = (x_1 - \mu_1) \cdot (x_2 - \mu_2)$$

Higher-Order Testing **Univariate**




Univariate:

$S_1 S_2$

- Shares are processed in parallel (HW)
- Leakages at the same time instance need to be combined first

Higher-Order Testing **Univariate**



Univariate:

$S_1 S_2$

- Shares are processed in parallel (HW)
- Leakages at the same time instance need to be combined first

$$\text{Variance: } x' = (x - \mu)^2$$


$$\text{In general: } x' = (x - \mu)^d$$

$$\text{In some cases: } x' = \left(\frac{x - \mu}{s}\right)^d$$

Correct Measurement

- **Setup**
- **Case Study: Microcontroller**
- **Case Study: FPGA**


Correct Measurement Setup



Pitfalls:

- Order of fixed and random inputs should be random as well
- Communication between **Control** and **Target** should be masked (if possible)


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
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Correct Measurement CS: Microcontroller



- AES with masking & shuffling (DPA contest v4.2)
- **No shared communication**
- First-order test


Correct Measurement CS: Microcontroller



- AES with masking & shuffling (DPA contest v4.2)
- **No shared communication**
- First-order test

Leakage associated to unmasked plaintext


Correct Measurement CS: Microcontroller




Detectable first order leakage

Correct Measurement CS: FPGA

First Order




Second Order




A note on the security of Higher-Order Threshold Implementations
Oscar Reparaz, ePrint Report 2015/001

Correct Measurement CS: FPGA

First Order




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
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Correct Measurement CS: FPGA


First Order




Second Order



Fifth Order



Second Order (bivariate)




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
Efficient Computation

- **Classical Approach**
- **Incremental**
- **Multivariate**
- **Parallelization**


Efficient Computation **Classical Approach**




Efficient Computation **Classical Approach**




Efficient Computation **Classical Approach**



Efficient Computation **Classical Approach**



Efficient Computation **Classical Approach**



Efficient Computation **Classical Approach**

t-Test →
$$t = \frac{\mu_0 - \mu_1}{\sqrt{\frac{s_0^2}{n_0} + \frac{s_1^2}{n_1}}}$$

Requires estimation of:

$$(\mu_0, s_0^2)$$

$$(\mu_1, s_1^2)$$

Reminder:

- $\mu = E(T)$
- $s^2 = E((T - \mu)^2)$

Efficient Computation **Classical Approach**

t -Test $\rightarrow t = \frac{\mu_0 - \mu_1}{\sqrt{\frac{s_0^2}{n_0} + \frac{s_1^2}{n_1}}}$

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$$T_0$$

$$T_1$$

...

$$T_{n-1}$$

Efficient Computation **Classical Approach**

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
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Pass 1



$\mu = E(T)$



Efficient Computation **Classical Approach**

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
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Pass 1

Pass 2



$\mu = E(T)$

$s^2 = E((T - \mu)^2)$

Efficient Computation **Classical Approach**


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Reminder:

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Efficient Computation **Classical Approach**

Problems:

- 1) Measurement phase need to be completed
- 2) All measurements need to be stored
- 3) Traces need to be loaded multiple times

Solution: *Incremental Computation*


Efficient Computation Incremental

Idea: Update intermediate values for each new trace

$$T_0$$


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
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Efficient Computation Incremental


Idea: Update intermediate values for each new trace



Higher-order tests require the computation of additional values

Efficient Computation Incremental

Idea: Update intermediate values for each new trace



Higher-order tests require the computation of additional values

Advantages:

- 1) Can be run in parallel to measurement phase
- 2) Does not require that all measurements are stored
- 3) Loads each trace only once

Efficient Computation Incremental

Problem: Computation of intermediate values

Efficient Computation **Incremental**

Problem: Computation of intermediate values

Approach 1: Use raw moments

$$\text{d}^{\text{th}}\text{-order raw moment: } M_d = E(T^d)$$

Given:

$$M_1$$

$$M_2$$

$$\text{Compute: } \mu = M_1 \quad s^2 = M_2 - (M_1)^2$$

Efficient Computation Incremental

Problem: Computation of intermediate values

Approach 1: Use raw moments

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Given:

$$M_1$$


$$M_2$$

$$\text{Compute: } \mu = M_1 \quad s^2 = M_2 - (M_1)^2$$


Higher-order test require additional moments

Example: Univariate 1st-5th order tests require $M_1 - M_{10}$


Efficient Computation Incremental




Efficient Computation **Incremental**



Efficient Computation **Incremental**




Efficient Computation Incremental




Easy to find update formulas for:

$$M_d = \sum_{i=0}^{n-1} \frac{(T_i)^d}{n}$$

Problem: Numerical unstable for large number of traces



Efficient Computation Incremental




Easy to find update formulas for:

$$M_d = \sum_{i=0}^{n-1} \frac{(T_i)^d}{n}$$

Problem: Numerical unstable for large number of traces

Example: Computation of variance based on simulations (100M traces) with $\mathcal{N}(100,25)$



Method	Order 1	Order 2	Order 3	Order 4	Order 5
3-Pass	25.08399	1258.18874	15.00039	96.08342	947.25523
Raw	25.08399	1258.14132	14.49282	-1160.83799	-1939218.83401

Efficient Computation **Incremental**

Approach 2: Use *central* moments (and M_1)

$$\text{d}^{\text{th}}\text{-order central moment: } CM_d = E \left((T - \mu)^d \right)$$

Given: M_1 CM_2

Compute: $\mu = M_1$ $s^2 = CM_2$

Efficient Computation **Incremental**

Approach 2: Use *central* moments (and M_1)

$$\text{d}^{\text{th}}\text{-order central moment: } CM_d = E \left((T - \mu)^d \right)$$

Given: M_1 CM_2

Compute: $\mu = M_1$ $s^2 = CM_2$

Not that easy to find update formulas for:

$$CM_d = \sum_{i=0}^{n-1} \frac{(T_i - \mu)^d}{n}$$

Multivariate tests require adjusted formulas

Efficient Computation Incremental

Incremental formulas for tests at arbitrary orders can be found in the paper.


Comparison to the raw moments approach:

- Slightly higher computational effort
- Less numerical problems, higher accuracy


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Ours	25.08399	1258.18874	15.00039	96.08342	947.25523

Efficient Computation Parallelization


Trace n





Trace $n+1$




Efficient Computation Parallelization



Efficient Computation Parallelization



Efficient Computation Parallelization



Example:

- 1st-5th order t -test
- 100,000,000 traces (each with 3,000 sample points)
- 9h on 2 x *Intel Xeon X5670* CPUs @ 2.93 GHz (24 hyper-threading cores)

Conclusion

- **Recommendations**
- **Summary**
- **Future Work**

Conclusion Recommendations

Fixed vs. random:

- DUT with *masking* countermeasure
- With masked communication

Semi-fixed vs. random:

- DUT with *hiding* countermeasure
- Without masked communication

Specific t-test:

- DUT with *no* countermeasures
- Failed in former non-specific tests
- Identify suitable intermediate values for key recovery

Conclusion Summary

- Testing based on the t -test is simple and fast
- Has become popular in recent years

Things to consider:

- Correct measurement phase is critical
- Analysis phase can be strongly optimized
- Higher-order testing easily possible

Additional important aspects:

- Alignment and signal processing is necessary
- Finding of points of interest

Conclusion **Future Work**

- Incremental computing for other attacks/evaluation techniques

Robust and One-Pass Parallel Computation of Correlation-Based Attacks at Arbitrary Order

Tobias Schneider, Amir Moradi, Tim Güneysu, ePrint Report 2015/571

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Thanks for Listening!

Any Questions?